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Abstract: Tito’s visit to Greece contributed to the Balkan Pact’s transformation into a 
military alliance. Despite the establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav diplomatic relations 
in 1953, the Soviet Union made no political move towards normalizing bilateral rela-
tions. For security reasons Tito visited Athens ( June 1954) to promote Yugoslavia’s 
military cooperation with Greece and Turkey without ruling out Yugoslavia’s acces-
sion to NATO. But the Soviet leadership, fearing Yugoslavia’s involvement in western 
defence mechanisms, sent the message to Belgrade that it was ready to recognise 
Stalin’s blunders towards Yugoslavia. Thus, Tito applied a policy of equidistance be-
tween East and West and refused to link up the Balkan Alliance with NATO.
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The Balkan Pact of 1953–54 has been thoroughly studied in interna-tional historiography and most of its aspects have been clarified.1 Little 
attention, however, has been paid to Tito’s visit to Greece, which had a 
1 For a first approach see John Iatrides, Balkan Triangle. Birth and decline of an alliance 
across ideological boundaries (The Hague & Paris: Mouton, 1968); Ηans Hartl, Der “ein-
ige” und “unabhängige” Balkan (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 1977), 51–65; Darko Bekić, 
Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu (Odnosi s velikim silama 1948–1955) (Zagreb: ČGP Delo, 
Globus, 1988), 488–511; Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952–1955. Jugoslovensko 
približavanje Nato-u (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2000), 76–89 and 141–154; David R. 
Stone, “The Balkan Pact and American Policy, 1950–1955”, Eastern European Quarterly 
28/3 (September 1994), 393–407; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Στα σύνορα των κόσμων. Η 
Ελλάδα και ο Ψυχρός Πόλεμος 1952–1967 [Greece and the Cold War. Frontline state 
1952–1967] (Athens: Patakis, 2009), 96–114; Dora Gota, “’Από την Άγκυρα στο Bled: 
Τα Βαλκανικά Σύμφωνα του 1953–54 μεταξύ Ελλάδας, Τουρκίας και Γιουγκοσλαβίας” 
[From Ankara to Bled. The Balkan agreements of 1953–54 between Greece, Turkey 
and Yugoslavia],Greek Historical Association, 28th Congress (25–27 May 2007), Proceed-
ings (Thessaloniki 2008), 274–279; Christos Tsardanidis, “’Η Ελλάδα και το Βαλκανικό 
Σύμφωνο”, Η ελληνική κοινωνία κατά την πρώτη μεταπολεμική περίοδο (1945–1967) 
[Greece and the Balkan Pact], in Greek society in the first post-war period (1945–1967) 
(Athens: Institut Sakis Karagiorgas, 1994), 210–222. Also, it is worth noting the pub-
lication of Yugoslav diplomatic and military documents in Balkanski Pakt. Ugovor o 
prijateljstvu i saradnji (Ankara, 28. februar 1953) i Ugovor o savezu, političkoj saradnji 
i uzajamnoj pomoći (Bled, 9. avgust 1954) između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugo-
slavije, Kraljevine Grčke i Republike Turske. Zbornik dokumenata iz Arhiva Vojnoistorijskog 
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significant effect on the Balkan Pact’s final transformation into a military 
alliance. The purpose of this paper is to examine Tito’s visit to Greece in 
the framework of bilateral Greek-Yugoslav relations and in a broader inter-
Balkan and international context as well.
The normalization of the Greek-Yugoslav relations in 1950–51 had 
paved the way for closer contacts between the two countries.2 For Belgrade 
and Athens security matters were of paramount importance, since it had 
been made clear that Tito’s breach with Stalin was not a mere episode. Yu-
goslavia turned out to be the main victim of the financial and psychological 
war, waged by the countries of the Soviet bloc, and its survival depended on 
American economic and military aid.3 After the normalization of Greek-
Yugoslav relations Greece pushed ahead with a plan for a military alliance 
between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey aiming at the formation of a com-
mon front for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea from Soviet expan-
sion. Yugoslavia turned down the Greek proposal, calculating that such a 
thing was not necessary since it pursued a peaceful policy, while, on the 
other hand, its joining a military alliance system with western countries 
might prompt the Soviet Union to launch a military strike against it. In the 
Yugoslav strategy the maintenance of economic and cultural relations with 
western countries took precedence over military issues.
Once Greece and Turkey had joined NATO at the Lisbon summit 
conference in February 1952, the issue of military cooperation between 
the two new NATO members and Yugoslavia was raised during bilateral 
Greek-Turkish discussions, but Athens and Ankara did not make any deci-
sion on that matter. The possibility of an alliance between Greece, Turkey 
and Yugoslavia perturbed Italy. Rome was worried that such an alliance 
would upgrade Yugoslavia’s role in the region and reinforce Tito’s negotiat-
ing position on the open issue of Trieste.4 
instituta, Arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova i Arhiva Josipa Broza Tita 1952–1960, ed. 
Μilan Τerzić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 2005).
2 On the normalization of Greek-Yugoslav relations see Spyridon Sfetas, “’Η εξομάλυνση 
των ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικών πολιτικών σχέσεων 1950/51”, Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα 12–
13 (2001–2), 191–207. 
3 On the likelihood of a Soviet military attack against Yugoslavia see Peter Vukmar, 
“The possibility of a Soviet military attack against Yugoslavia in British archival docu-
ments (1948–1953)”, Tokovi istorije 1–2 (2009), 163–176. 
4 On the Trieste dispute in the framework of Yugoslavia’s relations with the West see 
Dragan Bogetić, “Odnosi Jugoslavije sa Zapadom i Tršćansko pitanje (1948–1954)”, 
Istorija 20. veka 1 (1994), 122–138; Glenda Sluga, The problem of Trieste and the Italo-
Yugoslav Border. Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe (New 
York: State University Press, 2001).
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In 1952 Greece and Yugoslavia established a series of contacts aim-
ing at the achievement of a bilateral cooperation on defence issues. After 
the sweeping victory of Ellinikos Synagermos in the parliamentary elections 
(November 1952) and the formation of a stable majority government, Alex-
andros Papagos, the new prime minister, tried to boost the Greek-Yugoslav 
relations. He knew, as a former military officer, that a possible downfall of 
Yugoslavia would be an imminent threat for Greece. When Yugoslav mili-
tary delegates revisited Athens in December 1952, they were welcomed by 
King Pavlos and prime minister Papagos himself. Discussions between the 
Greek and the Yugoslav officers were focused on military plans to form a 
common defence front in case of an attack by states of the Soviet block.5 
This time the Yugoslav delegation disclosed its intentions to speed up the 
procedures towards reaching a military agreement, which had not been 
made clear during its previous visit to Greece in September.6 The continua-
tion of the Korean War and its implications on the Balkans, the danger of a 
new front in the Balkans as well as the political and economic benefits from 
a trilateral military agreement between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia may 
have been the main reasons that led Belgrade to back out of its initial posi-
tion. The Greek government asked the United States for consultations in 
order to ensure that a military alliance with Yugoslavia would be compatible 
with its obligations towards NATO.7 
But Italy opposed to any rapprochement between Greece, Yugoslavia 
and Turkey before the settlement of the Trieste question. Alcide De Gas-
peri, the Italian prime minister, hastily visited Athens on 8 January 1953 and 
sent the message that “until the Trieste question has been settled, Greece 
can count on Italy for the Mediterranean defence in the context of a ‘Medi-
terranean Pact’.”8 Italy also rejected the Turkish position that cooperation 
between Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Italy would lead to the settlement 
of the Trieste question, warning that the Italian army would never fight on 
the Yugoslav army’s side if the Trieste question was still in abeyance. When 
De Gasperi got the information that Fuad Köprülü, the Turkish foreign 
minister, planned to visit Belgrade, he characterized his visit as premature.9
5 See Balkanski pakt, ed. Terzić, 182–243.
6 Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954 [hereafter FRUS], vol. VIII, Eastern 
Europe-Soviet Union-Eastern Mediterranean, ed. William Z. Slany (Washington 1988), 
600–601, no. 314, The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 
Athens, December 31, 1952.
7 Ibid.
8 See Bekić, Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu, 491–492.
9 See Bogetić, Jugoslavija, 80.
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Taking the Italian objections into consideration, Washington carved 
out its policy in view of the forthcoming negotiations between Greece, Yu-
goslavia and Turkey:
The United States favour maximum possible progress on contingent mili-
tary planning between Turkey and Yugoslavia and Greece and Yugoslavia, 
although we consider that there should be no commitment of forces at this 
time. Such commitment should of course be subject to governmental deci-
sions in light of all circumstances and in consultations with NATO allies as 
appropriate.10
Yugoslavia’s admission to NATO was not a matter of urgency in the United 
States, since it was a long-lasting process and required the approval of other 
NATO members. England and France espoused the American position. 
Turkish as well as Greek diplomacy followed their allies’ guidelines. Dur-
ing his visit to Belgrade (20–26 January 1953), Fuad Köprülü made clear 
to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović, that a tripartite military 
agreement should come up as the final outcome of a procedure that would 
lead to Yugoslavia’s admission to NATO; however, he did not set any time-
table.11 As an alternative, Nuri Bigri, the Turkish deputy foreign minister, 
suggested the signing of a political treaty of friendship and cooperation 
without any military terms, so that it could pave the way for a military alli-
ance.12 Showing flexibility, Tito accepted the proposals for the signing of a 
tripartite treaty of friendship and cooperation between Yugoslavia, Turkey 
and Greece without any military obligations. From his point of view, such 
an agreement would satisfy public opinion in Yugoslavia and would have 
positive effects on the psychological propaganda war against the Soviets.13
Returning from Belgrade, Köprülü visited Athens (26–30 January 
1953) and informed Papagos and Stefanos Stefanopoulos, the Greek for-
eign minister, about his new initiative regarding the treaty of friendship and 
cooperation. The Greek side agreed on promoting such an initiative. In his 
visit to Yugoslavia (3–7 February 1953), Stefanopoulos officially announced 
the Greek position: tripartite negotiations for the signing of a political 
10 See FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 610, no. 318, The Counselor of Embassy in Turkey 
(Roontree) to the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) at Istanbul, Ankara, January 16, 
1953. Suggested line to take with Foreign Minister Koprulu upon Yugoslavia.
11 See Terzić, Balkanski pakt, 247.
12 Ibid., 248.
13 FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 613, no. 320, The Ambassador in Greece (Peurofory) to 
the Department of State, Athens, January 28, 1953. Discussion between the American 
ambassador and Köprülü during his short stay in Athens on his return from Belgrade. 
Köprülü presented the proposal for a tripartite friendship treaty as Tito’s idea. However, 
it was Turkey’s initiative.
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treaty and continuation of discussions in order to reach the conclusion of a 
military treaty.14 Immediately after that, a tripartite military conference was 
held in Ankara (17–20 February 1953), while on 20 February 1953 summit 
talks between the foreign ministers of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey were 
conducted in Athens. On 28 February 1953 the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation was signed in Ankara by the foreign minister of Greece, Ste-
fanos Stefanopoulos, Turkey, Fuad Köprülü, and Yugoslavia, Koča Popović. 
The terms of the treaty provided mutual efforts of the Signatories to main-
tain peace and to examine in common security issues, extension of coopera-
tion in economic, technical and cultural matters, and peaceful settlement of 
differences. Greece and Turkey would maintain their rights and obligations 
towards NATO, while the General Staffs of the three countries would co-
operate to make suggestions to their governments on security and defence 
issues and to coordinate the decision-making.15
For the Yugoslav leadership it was self-evident that NATO would 
support Yugoslavia if the country was under attack. Visiting Great Britain 
in March 1953, Tito discussed Balkan and European security issues with 
Winston Churchill and Antony Eden. Tito pointed out that a Soviet attack 
on Yugoslavia would not only trigger regional war but could also turn into 
a global conflict; he asked for western military support for Yugoslavia and 
explained the reasons he was opposing Yugoslavia’s accession to NATO. 
The British leaders pledged military aid in case of a threat to Yugoslavia’s 
territorial integrity and revealed a plan for the transformation of the Balkan 
Pact into a Mediterranean Pact with Italy’s participation, after the settle-
ment of the Trieste question.16
The Balkan Pact was ratified by the three countries (on 28 March 
1953 by the Greek and Yugoslav Parliament and on 18 May 1953 by the 
Turkish parliament) and on 24 June Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey pub-
lished a declaration on common strategy in facing the new political and 
military challenges. The first conference of the foreign ministers was held 
in Athens from 7 to 11 July 1953. Stefanopoulos, Köprülu and Popović de-
cided to establish a Permanent Secretariat, they stressed the peaceful policy 
14 See Tsardanidis, “’Η Ελλάδα και το Βαλκανικό Σύμφωνο”, 219–220.
15 See Balkanski pakt, ed. Terzić, 311–313.
16 Djordje Borozan, “Jugoslovensko-britanski razgovori u Beogradu 1953. i Londonu 
1953. godine”, Istorija XX veka 21 (1997), 113–127. Early in 1953 the Soviets were, 
indeed, elaborating Tito’s assassination either in Belgrade or at the Yugoslav embassy in 
London during the Yugoslav leader’s visit to London. Regarding this issue see relevant 
document at: wilsoncenter.org/index, Cold War International History Project. Digital Ar-
chive. Collection: Yugoslavia in the Cold War. Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito (01/01/1953). 
After Stalin’s death the plan was abandoned and Tito safely returned from London. 
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of their countries towards neighbouring states, mainly as far as Albania’s 
territorial integrity was concerned, and entrusted the General Staffs of their 
countries with the study of conditions for a tripartite military cooperation. 
The first military conference, after the signing of the Balkan Pact, had al-
ready taken place in Athens (3–13 June 1953).
Greece attached great importance to a military alliance with Yugo-
slavia, but it avoided challenging Italy and fulfilled its obligations towards 
NATO. During the Trieste crisis in September–October 1953 Greece took 
a neutral stance.17 The Greek-American agreement of 12 October 1953 on 
the installation of American military bases on Greek soil upgraded Greece’s 
importance within NATO and gave Athens a strategic advantage against 
Ankara in promoting western policies in the Balkans.18
The basic reason for signing the Balkan Pact had been the Soviet 
threat. The “friendship attack policy” towards the West, initiated by Nikita 
Khrushchev after Stalin’s death (5/3/1953), the re-establishment of the So-
viet-Yugoslav diplomatic relations in June 1953, the execution of Lavrenti 
Beriya, the powerful head of the Soviet secret police, in December 1953 
and the Soviet Union’s diplomatic support of Yugoslavia during the Tri-
este crisis in September–October 1953 temporarily created in Belgrade the 
impression that the Soviet threat had been eliminated. Nevertheless, since 
Khrushchev had not undertaken any substantial initiative for the fully-
fledged normalization of the Soviet-Yugoslav relations and there was no 
evidence that he would cope with Stalin’s closer comrades, Tito abided by 
the Balkan Pact and the three countries’ General Staffs started negotiations 
(10–20 November 1953 in Belgrade, 24 March – 1 April 1954 in Ankara). 
They elaborated preliminary plans to form a military alliance. It was gener-
ally agreed that, if Bulgaria launched an attack against Yugoslavia, Greece 
and Turkey would automatically engage in the conflict, since they shared a 
common frontier with Bulgaria. Should Yugoslavia be attacked by Romania 
17 In September 1953 Papagos visited Rome. On 8 October 1953 Britain and the US 
announced to Yugoslavia that they were going to cede the city of Trieste and zone A to 
Italy. Tito opposed to it and asked the Security Council to intervene. See Dora Gota, 
“’Αλληλεπιδράσεις στους διπλωματικούς χειρισμούς του ζητήματος της Τεργέστης και 
των Βαλκανικών συμφωνιών του 1953–1954” [Interactions in the diplomatic manage-
ment of the Trieste issue and the Balkan agreements of 1953–54], Greek Historical As-
sociation, 29th Congress (16–18 May 2008), Proceedings (Thessaloniki 2009), 372–373. 
The Papagos government took a neutral attitude.
18 On the Greek-American Agreement of 12 October 1953 see Ioannis Stefanidis, 
Ασύμμετροι εταίροι. Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και η Ελλάδα στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο 1953–
1961 [Asymmetric Partners. United States and Greece in the Cold War 1953–1961] 
(Athens: Patakis, 2005), 199–243. 
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or Hungary or invaded by armed groups, Greece’s and Turkey’s attitude 
needed to be clarified.
The military alliance with Yugoslavia was regarded as a basic security 
matter by the Papagos government. Despite the Greek-American agree-
ment on military bases, ground forces were expected to play a decisive role in 
case of war in the Balkans. In this respect, the Yugoslav army’s contribution 
was indispensable. The Papagos government was alarmed when the Milo-
van Djilas case came up early in 1954. Djilas accused the Yugoslav leaders of 
undermining the economic system of workers’ self-management due to the 
Communist Party and the state’s pervasive influence; he called for less bu-
reaucracy and more democracy and criticized the luxurious life of his com-
rades. In January 1954 Djilas was expelled from the Central Committee.19 
The Djilas case was (mistakenly) understood by the Papagos government as 
Soviet machination against Yugoslavia. In the light of these events, Athens 
considered that procedures for a military alliance with Yugoslavia had to 
be accelerated.20 Nevertheless, Washington did not share Athens’ anxiety. 
America considered the Djilas case as an indication of western liberalism’s 
influence on Yugoslavia, without any grave implications for Yugoslavia’s for-
eign policy, which was balanced between the East and the West. 
The United States had suggested that Athens should not be hasty 
in concluding a military treaty with Yugoslavia under the current circum-
stances, since the Trieste question had not yet been settled.21 However, the 
Papagos government ignored the American reservations when it became 
known that during Tito’s visit to Ankara, in mid April 1954, the Yugoslav 
leader had discussed the transformation of the Ankara Treaty into a formal 
military alliance with the Turkish government without informing Athens 
which was merely asked for its approval.22 Greece expressed its discontent, 
considering that it had been pushed aside on an issue on which the Greek 
leaders believed that they should have been consulted.23 In order to create 
19 With a series of articles in the Borba daily (11/11/1953 – 7/1/1954) and a lengthy 
article entitled “Anatomy of Moral” in Nova Misao journal ( January 1954) Djilas dis-
cussed the failure of so-called workers’ self-management and the emergence of a new 
red class in Yugoslavia. Also, in an article in Komunist in the autumn of 1953, he ex-
pressed his doubts that the Soviet Union would ever reach real Socialism. See Slobodan 
Stanković, Titos Erbe (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 1981), 89–110.
20 FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 639–640, no. 336, The Ambassador to Greece (Cannon) 
to the Department of State, Athens, February 13, 1954, Top Secret.
21 Ibid., 640–642, no. 337, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 
Washington, February 16, 1954. Top Secret.
22 See To Vima, 16 April 1954.
23 See To Vima, 17 April 1954.
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a climate of confidence between Athens and Ankara, Fuad Köprülü imme-
diately informed the Greek ambassador in Ankara, Ioannis Kallergis, that 
during the Turkish-Yugoslav negotiations the two countries had expressed 
only their desire to reinforce their common efforts to transform the Ankara 
Treaty into a military alliance; at the same time the Turkish embassy in 
Athens gave similar assurances to the ministry of foreign affairs’ secretary 
Alexis Kyrou.24 It is evident from the proceedings (13/4/1954) of the dis-
cussions between Tito, the president of Turkey, Celâl Bayar, the Turkish 
prime minister, Adnan Menderes, and the Turkish foreign minister Fuad 
Köprülü, that the transformation of the Ankara Treaty into a military alli-
ance was marginally treated.25 The Greek reaction came after Popović’s pub-
lic statement on 15 April in Ankara about the transformation of the Ankara 
Treaty into a military alliance. Nevertheless, after Kallergis’ intervention a 
special reference to the Greek role was included in the communiqué that 
was released by Turkey and Yugoslavia on 16 April 1954. 
During the discussions that were conducted in a spirit of absolute cordial-
ity, which is indicative of the friendly relations between Yugoslavia and 
Turkey, every issue — general and specific — of common interest was de-
bated thoroughly. The necessary acquiescence of Greece, which is a valuable 
Signatory of the Ankara Treaty, has always been taken into account…
In that respect, the tripartite Ankara Treaty is of major significance and it 
is essential to upgrade its value and its effectiveness day by day…
This Treaty was concluded in a spirit of alliance and every action related to 
its implementation is taken towards this direction. As a result, the time has 
come for its transformation to a formal alliance, which depends only on the 
circumstances now.26
The Turkish press commented on “Greek mistrust”, although Greece’s sus-
picions had been dispelled after Turkey’s official explanations and Popović’s 
statement in Constantinople that the transformation of the Balkan Pact into 
a military alliance would take its final shape during Marshal Tito’s visit to 
Greece and that Turkey’s opinion could be requested, if new circumstances 
called for it.27 There was a latent antagonism between Greece and Turkey 
regarding each country’s importance within NATO. Greece had recognized 
Turkey’s leading role on issues regarding the Middle East and it claimed 
the right to have the initiative on Balkan issues. The Papagos government 
believed that the Greek-American agreement of 12 October 1953 had in-
creased the importance of Greece’s role. Nonetheless, after Khrushchev’s 
24 See To Vima, 18 April 1954.
25 See Balkanski pakt, ed. Terzić, 630–635.
26 Ibid., 639.
27 See To Vima, 20 April 1954.
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statement that the Soviet Union had no territorial differences with Turkey, 
Athens considered that Bulgaria and the Soviet Union constituted a greater 
threat for Greece and Yugoslavia.
In view of Tito’s visit to Athens, Yugoslavia’s ministry of foreign affairs 
drew up a special memorandum regarding several important issues which, 
apart from the main question of the military alliance, could be brought into 
discussion. Such issues, relating to Greek-Yugoslav relations, were the free 
zone of Thessaloniki, the “Macedonian minority” in Greece, the problem 
of the monks in the Serbian monastery of Chilandar and the proposal of a 
Greek deputy, Matsas, for the establishment of a Balkan Consultative As-
sembly.28 
Regarding the free zone of Thessaloniki Yugoslavia claimed the right 
to choose the workmen for loading and unloading merchandise from ships. 
Yugoslavia had the right to choose only workers who were employed within 
the zone. The Greek side considered that any ship entering the zone was 
subject to Greek legislation. Since Greece’s territorial integrity within the 
zone was recognized by Yugoslavia, Athens considered that only Greece 
had the right to hire the workmen for loading and unloading ships.29 The 
establishment of a Balkan Consultative Assembly, patterned after the 
Scandinavian model, was Matsas’ proposal. The latter was a member of the 
Greek parliament from Papagos’ party and chairman of the movement for 
Europe’s unification. The problem was, according to the Yugoslav govern-
ment’s evaluation of the proposal, the political character attributed to the 
suggested Balkan Consultative Assembly. Matsas envisaged an enlarged 
Balkan Consultative Assembly with the participation of Bulgaria, Albania 
and Romania. These countries would be represented by political anticom-
munist emigration, not by deputies of their formal Parliaments. The Balkan 
Consultative Assembly’s main purpose was to wrest Bulgaria, Albania and 
Romania away from the Soviet orbit. Although the Balkan Consultative 
Assembly was formally a non-governmental organization, its political anti-
Soviet propaganda would cause strong reactions in Albania, Bulgaria and 
Romania with the real danger of undermining Yugoslavia’s efforts to nor-
malize its relations with the Soviet Union. Taking these parameters into 
consideration, Yugoslavia had to request some clarifications regarding the 
character and objectives of the Balkan Consultative Assembly.30 As far as 
28 Belgrade, Arhiv Predsednika Republike (APR) [Archive of the President of the Re-
public], Kabinet Predsednika Republike (KPR) [Office of the President of the Republic] 
I-2/3, Put Josipa Broza Tita u Grčku [ Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Greece], 2–6/6/1954. 
Materijal za političke razgovore.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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the Serbian monastery of Chilandar was concerned, Yugoslavia should de-
mand the increase of the number of Serbian monks in order to prevent its 
“Hellenization”.31 Finally, the problem of the Macedonian minority took a 
central position in the Memorandum. A special mention was made to its 
non-recognition by the Greek government, to the regime of “terrorism” in 
Northern Greece, to the emigration wave of the Slavomacedonians to Aus-
tralia, to the Greek Legislative Act, introduced in August 1953, concerning 
the colonization of Greek borderlands and property confiscation of the Ae-
geans who participated in the Civil War and abandoned Greece. The Greek 
consulate in Skopje was accused of espionage and obstructionism in issuing 
visas to Slavomacedonian businessmen.32 Greek authorities were blamed 
for rejecting Yugoslavia’s request for the repatriation of Macedonians from 
Greece that had found shelter in Yugoslavia as political refugees (23,000). 
A diplomatic incident that occurred on the 2nd of August 1953, anniversary 
of Ilinden, was also mentioned. The Greek consul, Iraklidis, left the Na-
tional Museum in protest due to the presentation of a map which included 
the Greek region of Macedonia within the borders of Yugoslav Macedonia, 
where the Ilinden uprising took place. The Greek ambassador in Belgrade, 
Spyros Kapetanidis, submitted a diplomatic note to the Yugoslav ministry 
of foreign affairs regarding this map. The Yugoslav memorandum did warn 
of the negative consequences for Greek-Yugoslav relations which could en-
sue from the circulation of the journal Glas na Egejcite [The Voice of the Ae-
geans] by “Aegean” refugees in Skopje. With its incendiary articles against 
Greece and America, the above magazine sapped Yugoslavia’s foreign policy 
towards Greece because: 1) it provided the Greek side with arguments to 
accuse the People’s Republic of Macedonia of undermining the Balkan 
Pact; 2) it sabotaged the Yugoslav government‘s efforts to claim better con-
ditions for Macedonians living in Greece; 3) it helped Greece justify its 
measures to assimilate the Macedonian population. Thus, the replacement 
of the editorial board was considered to be imperative. Last but not least, 
the Memorandum suggested that the Macedonia minority issue would be 
settled by promoting bilateral cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia 
and that the Yugoslav delegation had to raise this question during Tito’s 
visit to Greece. Yugoslavia should explicitly reject any territorial claims on 
Greece and accept the current borderline as definitive, 
but on condition that the Greek government, in a spirit of understanding 
and friendship, will provide members of the Macedonian minority with 
the usual minority rights (right to use their mother tongue in public and 
in court, education in the Macedonian language in primary and secondary 
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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schools, lifting of discriminatory policies and repatriation of refugees from 
Aegean Macedonia living in Yugoslavia) … Even if neither side raises the 
problem during the forthcoming discussions, we will stick to our position. 
That is mainly to make possible the repatriation of refugees from Greek 
Macedonia and to thwart the implementation of the colonization law.33 
It is evident that Yugoslavia linked up the inviolability of the Greek-
Yugoslav border with the recognition of Macedonian minority by Greek 
government. Tito did not intend to broach the Macedonian issue during 
his forthcoming visit to Greece, due to the delicate nature of the Greek-
Yugoslav relations. Since it was impossible for Papagos to raise an issue that 
did not exist from the Greek point of view, it was certain that the Mace-
donian question would be overlooked during the discussions. It had been 
already discussed. The map of Greater Macedonia during the celebrations of 
Ilinden’s anniversary on the 2nd of August 1953 and the Greek Legislative 
Act regarding the borderland colonization in August 1953 had given both 
sides the opportunity to exchange their views on this matter. The Yugoslav 
side connected the law on colonization with Papagos’ visit to Rome and the 
supposedly pro-Italian Greek attitude towards the Trieste problem. Con-
cerning the Greek “Legislative Act for borderland colonization and support 
to its population”, the opinion of Yugoslavia’s Legal Council made clear that 
the act was not discriminatory since it affected all Greek citizens. Besides, 
Yugoslavia could not interfere in Greece’s internal affairs.34 Regarding the 
map of Greater Macedonia in the Museum of the Liberation Struggle, Yu-
goslavia’s ministry of foreign affairs explained that the map depicted merely 
the areas where the battles of 1903 were fought; it was a map of historical 
importance and a museum exhibit.35 
The Papagos government bypassed Italy’s objections to Tito’s visit. 
Stefanos Stefanopoulos made clear to the Italian embassy in Athens that 
the Balkan Pact had no anti-Italian spearhead and it would reinforce Bal-
kan defence and NATO’s strategy as well. Italy had no reason to speak out 
against the Balkan Alliance, since it had already accepted the Balkan Pact 
that aimed at the formation of an alliance. He denied any connection of the 
envisaged Balkan Alliance with the Trieste problem, pointing out that Italy 
and Yugoslavia had enough time to settle the Trieste problem until the for-
mation of the alliance. The Greek foreign minister concluded that Greece, 
33 Ibid.
34 See Kostas Katsanos, Το Μακεδονικό και η Γιουγκοσλαβία. Πλήρη τα απόρρητα 
γιουγκοσλαβικά έγγραφα 1950–1967 [The Macedonian question and Yugoslavia. Clas-
sified Yugoslav documents 1950–1967] (Thessaloniki: Association of Macedonian 
Studies, 2009), 90–91.
35 Ibid., 92.
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Turkey and Yugoslavia would keep NATO’s Council informed regarding 
their decisions.36 
On 2 June Tito sailed into Piraeus on the Yugoslav yacht “Galeb”, 
accompanied by Popović. When the Yugoslav yacht entered Greek territo-
rial waters, it was escorted by the Greek destroyers “Aetos” and “Panther”. 
“Galeb” sailed along the coast of Corfu and when it approached the island 
of Vido where a Serbian military cemetery is located, Tito cast a wreath 
in the sea with the inscription “For World War I heroes”. When Tito and 
Popović disembarked in Piraeus, they were welcomed by prime minister 
Papagos, King Pavlos and others.37 
On 3 June Greek-Yugoslav discussions began at the ministry of for-
eign affairs. The Greek side was represented by Papagos, Stefanopoulos, 
Alexis Kyrou, the secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs, Christos Ka-
petanidis, the Greek ambassador in Belgrade, and G. Christopoulos, the 
head of Balkan affairs at the foreign ministry. Yugoslavia was represented 
by Tito, Popović, Radoš Jovanović, the Yugoslav ambassador in Athens, and 
Djura Ninčić, Popović’s advisor.
Papagos characterized Tito’s visit as proof of Greek-Yugoslav friend-
ship and the Yugoslav leader’s strong personality as the best symbol of Yu-
goslavia’s willingness to fight for freedom and independence on the Greek 
people’s side. He pointed out that Moscow’s imperialistic plans still existed, 
since the Russians had never renounced their objective to conquer the civi-
lized world, they had only modified their methods and tactics for domestic 
policy reasons. Thus, the evolution of the Balkan Pact into an alliance con-
stituted a historical step forward, as he himself had underscored the neces-
sity of an alliance between Greece and Yugoslavia in 1950–51.38 The Greek 
prime minister rejected that there was any connection between the Balkan 
Alliance and the Trieste problem, on which the Greek government kept a 
neutral stance and desired the best solution; however Greece, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia would not be hostages of this issue. After these general remarks, 
Papagos came to more substantial issues, regarding the functioning of the 
Balkan Alliance. He suggested the establishment of an experts’ committee 
to carve out the alliance on the basis of the following principles. 1) A local 
conflict can quickly grow into a regional one. 2) An attack against one coun-
try is considered to be an attack against the other two. An enemy state is 
the one that launches an attack no matter whether it is Hungary, Romania, 
36 To Vima, 2 June 1954.
37 To Vima, 3 June 1954.
38 APR-KPR, I-2/3, Zabeleška o razgovorima Predsednika Republike s Pretsednikom 
grčke vlade, maršalom Papagosom, vodjenim u Atini 3.VI.1954, u prostorijama grčkog 
Ministarstva inostranih poslova u 17 časova. 
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Bulgaria or the Soviet Union attacking from the Black Sea or the Caucasus. 
The experts’ committee would assess whether there would be a distinction 
between cases where the attacking country had a common border with the 
three allies, where the common defence policy should automatically be ap-
plied, and cases where there were no common borders. In case there were 
common borders, there would be some automatic response mechanisms, 
and it is understandable that the three countries should follow the situation 
and take the necessary measures, such as mobilisation and concentration of 
troops. It is a task for the experts to prepare a common defence plan until 
the next foreign ministers’ conference. In the second case, that the allied 
states had no common borders with the attacking state, a regulation could 
be adopted similar to Article 5 of the NATO treaty. 3) The relations between 
the Balkan Alliance and NATO or the European Defence Community [the 
European army that was being considered, a French-German plan that did 
not yield any results, S.S.], had to be specified. In his conclusion, Papagos 
proposed the establishment of a Balkan Consultative Assembly, according 
to the Scandinavian model. Each country could send a delegation of 15 to 
20 members of their national parliaments. The purpose of this assembly 
would be to examine thoroughly all issues of common interest not only for 
the governments, but also for the peoples.39 
Tito expressed his satisfaction at meeting Papagos in person and shar-
ing his views. He was pleased to accept Papagos’ suggestion for the Balkan 
Alliance defence system’s automatism that should be activated without any 
hesitation. He also denied any connection between the Balkan Alliance and 
the Trieste problem and rejected, as unrealistic, any allegation that Yugo-
slavia was attempting to exploit the Balkan Alliance in order to strengthen 
its position on the Trieste problem. His visit to Athens did not aim at the 
direct signing of a military agreement, but at promoting the alliance case, 
that would be undertaken by experts from the three countries. He agreed 
with Papagos that there were external threats and for this reason a tripartite 
military cooperation agreement, as well as a Balkan Consultative Assembly, 
39 Ibid. Article 5 of NATO’s Charter defines that “the Parties agree that an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, 
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised 
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken 
as result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures 
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security.”
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were necessary. He admitted that the Soviet policy had not undergone any 
radical change and that it exploited western countries’ weaknesses. The So-
viet-Yugoslav relations had not been normalized yet and for this reason Tito 
stressed the need of a Balkan Alliance:
We consented to their initiatives to normalize our relations. However, there 
was not any serious step taken by their side, although we reestablished our 
diplomatic relations last year. Not only is there no progress in the normal-
ization process, but they have not taken any serious action to bring our 
relations to the level they should be between countries of a different sys-
tem. Soviet-Yugoslav relations are a miniature of the Soviet Union’s policy 
towards the world. Soviet policy should not hypnotize us and I agree that 
we must stay alert – they have changed their tactics but their purpose is 
still the same. Meanwhile, I repeat that our three countries must form this 
alliance, even if changes occur. Anyone who has good intentions should not 
fear our alliance.40 
Commenting on the political conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
countries after Stalin’s death, Tito characterized them as unstable and fluid. 
Regarding the European Defence Community, the Yugoslav leader pointed 
out that his country had a positive attitude towards it, although he believed 
that it would be a mistake if this new organization had exclusively military 
responsibilities, without developing any mechanism that could help Euro-
pean countries overcome their economic difficulties.41 However, he stated 
that Yugoslavia, despite its positive attitude towards the European Defence 
Community, did not desire accession to NATO for the time being:
That does not mean we do not recognize NATO’s positive role. We do 
not wish to join this organization for specific reasons, but this does not 
mean that there should not be cooperation with NATO. Such cooperation 
can take many forms, without any obligation for Yugoslavia to join this 
organization. There can be a different way of cooperation, either directly 
between Yugoslavia and NATO or through the Balkan Alliance. Yugoslavia 
is a member of this defence system. Thus, our attitude towards NATO has 
not changed, and that also means that we would discuss our accession to 
NATO, if the threat increases and becomes imminent.42 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. The main reason for the establishment of a western European defensive army 
was to prevent Germany from forming an independent military force. Essentially it was 
going to be a common French-German military. The signing of the agreement for the 
establishment of the European Defence Community took place in Paris on 27 May 
1952. The establishing members were France, Western Germany and the BENELUX 
countries. However, it was a stillborn establishing act. On 30 August 1954 the French 
parliament rejected the agreement for the establishment of the European Defence 
Community, with 319 votes against and 163 votes for.
42 Ibid.
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Stefanopoulos agreed with Papagos’ and Tito’s positions. He stressed 
that the Balkan alliance was not directed against Italy and he accused Rome 
of making a political mistake by pretending that Yugoslavia was using the 
Balkan alliance for its own purposes. He made an interesting statement con-
cerning the delicate issue of the Balkan alliance’s relations with NATO:
Yugoslavia does not desire to join NATO for its own political reasons. 
We and Turkey are members of NATO and we have specific responsibili-
ties towards NATO. Article 8 of NATO’s Charter forbids its members to 
undertake any obligation that contravenes NATO’s purposes. We support 
our view that our alliance complies with NATO’s aims ... We consider that 
our alliance is an important deterrent force and for this reason any deci-
sion should be taken unanimously. It is a fact that Italy misinterprets our 
alliance. However, NATO is not a supranational union; it is a union of sov-
ereign states. We have announced that we are willing to submit our agree-
ment to NATO’s Council. The Balkan Alliance’s ties with NATO must 
be examined. NATO is a major force. Not only do European countries 
participate in it, but also America and Canada with their vast economic 
potential. It is important that the Balkan Alliance can count on NATO.43 
The Greek foreign minister stressed the importance of the European De-
fence Community and hinted at the likelihood of Yugoslavia’s accession to 
western European institutions. Announcing the ending of the conference, 
Papagos and Tito pointed out that they had reached an agreement on all the 
basic issues and that the foreign ministers, in cooperation with the Turkish 
ambassador in Athens, could elaborate the core of the agreement and pre-
pare a mutual communiqué.
It was evident that the Balkan Military Alliance should have three 
keystones, according to Papagos: 1) in case of Bulgarian attack against 
Greece, Yugoslavia or Turkey, the defensive mechanism of the allied coun-
tries would be automatically activated, since the three countries shared 
common borders with Bulgaria; 2) in case of Romanian or Hungarian at-
tack against Yugoslavia or of Soviet attack against Turkey, a stipulation in 
the spirit of Article 5 of NATO’s Charter should be activated, meaning that 
the other parties of the Balkan Alliance would take action to support the at-
tacked state, including the use of military force; 3) the Balkan Military Al-
liance should be linked up with NATO. Practically, this meant that NATO 
as a body would assist Yugoslavia in case of Soviet attack, while Yugoslavia 
would take on the responsibility of supporting other NATO states, except 
Greece and Turkey, against a Soviet attack.
The following day, June 4th, the Greek and Yugoslav foreign minis-
ters met the Turkish Ambassador in Athens. The purpose of the meeting 
was to elaborate a mutual communiqué that had already been drafted by 
43 Ibid.
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Alexis Kyrou and Koča Popović. The contentious point was a phrase stat-
ing that the Alliance “will be established” (sera établi) by the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the next annual conference in Belgrade. 
Taraj, the Turkish ambassador, anticipating Italian reactions, suggested the 
replacement of the expression “will be established” by the phrase “will be 
examined” (examiné). In his view, it was inappropriate to take the forma-
tion of an alliance for granted, before the Trieste issue was settled and the 
relations between Yugoslavia and NATO were clarified.44 In their response, 
Stefanopoulos and Kyrou emphasized the ambivalence of the term “estab-
lished” and argued that it could be interpreted in a broader sense. “Estab-
lishment” did not necessarily mean the “signing” of the Alliance Treaty, but 
the completion of the procedures. The relations between Yugoslavia and 
NATO should be regulated after the Trieste issue was settled. Stefanopou-
los compared Yugoslavia’s position within the Balkan Alliance with that of 
West Germany within the European Defence Community and insisted that 
the experts’ committee should have finished their work by the next meeting 
of foreign ministers.45 The Turkish ambassador needed some time to consult 
his government, before announcing his approval of the communiqué.46 
The next meeting of foreign ministers was scheduled for July 1954. 
By setting a timetable for the formation of the Balkan Alliance, Greece and 
Yugoslavia exerted pressure on Italy to speed up the negotiations to settle 
the Trieste issue. If the Turkish proposal was adopted, Koča Popović be-
lieved that Italy would keep stalling the settlement of the Trieste issue.
The following day, 5 June, Stefanopoulos and Popović with their staff 
examined bilateral issues. The Yugoslav minister raised the question of Yu-
goslav industrial products exports to Greece, the foundation of a Balkan In-
stitute, the Balkan Consultative Assembly, the free zone of Thessaloniki and 
the monastery of Chilandar.47 Stefanopoulos responded that 1) he would 
inform the Federation of Greek Industries about the imports of Yugoslav 
products by Greece; 2) both governments should define the matters the 
Balkan Consultative Assembly had to tackle; 3) the aims of the Balkan 
Institute should be clear. This question had already been raised by Popović 
during his discussions with Köprülü on 17 April. The latter envisaged the 
Balkan Institute as a “think-tank” that would carry out scientific research on 
44 APR-KPR I-2/3. Zabeleška sa sastanka održanog u grčkom Ministarstva inostranih 
poslova 4.VI.1954 u 11 časova radi izrade kominikea o boravku Pretsednika Republike 
u Grčkoj.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 APR-KPR I-2/3. Zabeleška o sastanku održanom u Ministarstvu inostranih poslova 
Grčke 5.VI.1954 god. u 11 časova.
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substantial issues the Balkan countries were facing. As a historian, Köprülü 
had accepted Popović’s proposal; 4) As regards the free zone of Thessaloniki, 
Stefanopoulos shared Popović’s view that Yugoslav officials entrusted with 
administrative duties in the zone would be exempted from taxes and tar-
iffs. However, they were not entitled to select the workers within the zone, 
according to the Greek legislation. Popović did not object; 5) As regards 
the monastery of Chilandar, Stefanopoulos accepted Yugoslavia’s request 
for the numerical increase of Serbian monks and the maintenance of the 
monastery’s historic monuments and relics.48 
Popović avoided broaching the issue of the Macedonian minority in 
Greece. When Kyrou referred to the corrosive role of the journal The Voice 
of the Aegeans that undermined the efforts of both countries to boost Greek-
Yugoslav relations, Popović tried to play down the matter, by distancing 
himself from this journal, but he admitted that its publications had had a 
negative effect on the Greek-Yugoslav relations and revealed that the Yugo-
slav government planned to change the editorial board.49 
Kyrou sounded out Popović on Yugoslavia’s attitude towards the Cy-
prus question, in case Greece decided to bring the issue to the UN. He 
explained that Greece aimed at the internationalization of the Cyprus ques-
tion without giving to this political motion any anti-British character, more-
over it wanted to stress that the Cyprus question had been left in abeyance 
and affected the relations of the two UN member-states. Kyrou pointed 
out that Turkey had not expressed its official position yet, and despite the 
negative comments in the Turkish press, Greece did not expect that Turkey 
would speak out against the internationalization of the Cyprus question. 
Nevertheless, Greece would stick to its decision in spite of Turkey’s attitude. 
Popović responded that Yugoslavia would carve out its policy when Greece 
raised the question, but he stated in advance that the principle of self-deter-
mination was the keystone of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy.50 
Should Turkey not accept the formula “establishment” for the Balkan 
Alliance, Kyrou pointed out that the paragraph referring to Turkey’s con-
sensus would be omitted and the communiqué would reflect only the Greek 
and the Yugoslav position. But during the discussions the Turkish ambassa-
dor contacted the delegations, stating that his government had accepted the 
text of the communiqué as it had been drafted by Kyrou and Popović. Thus, 
they agreed that each country would set up a committee of three to four 
experts (legal advisors, military officers, diplomats) to draft the final text 
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
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of the Military Agreement.51 In his response to Kyrou’s and Stefanopoulos’ 
questions regarding the Balkan Military Alliance’s relations with NATO, 
Popović argued that this was not a priority issue, since the three countries 
had the necessary forces to repel an attack. The West would provide material 
support irrespective of Yugoslavia’s relations with NATO. Stefanopoulos 
agreed and emphasized that the Council of NATO would be kept informed 
about the forthcoming signing of the Military Alliance Treaty.52 The text of 
the communiqué was as follows:
At the invitation of the King of Greece, President Josip Broz Tito ar-
rived in Athens on 2 June 1954 for an official visit, escorted by Mr. Koča 
Popović, minister of foreign affairs. During the discussions that Marshal 
Tito had with prime minister Alexandros Papagos and foreign minister 
Mr. S. Stefanopoulos the international situation was thoroughly examined 
in the light of recent events.
These discussions, conducted in a warm atmosphere, demonstrated once 
more the close friendship between Yugoslavia and Greece and proved the 
consensus of their opinions on all the issues that were examined.
The examination of specific issues of common interest for both countries 
proved harmonious bilateral relations and made clear their willingness to 
stabilize them. We expressed our desire to extend our constructive coopera-
tion on a political, economic and cultural level. It was concluded that the 
progress made to this day on an economic level is very satisfactory and that 
the spirit of sincere and complete cooperation, on which our relations are 
based, justifies our optimism for a fruitful future.
Major international problems were examined with consideration of their 
effect on both countries’ interests and on peacekeeping in Europe. It was 
admitted that the current international situation prompted the members 
of the tripartite Ankara Agreement to stay alert. It required their close and 
systematic cooperation.
In the belief of all Signatories of the Ankara Agreement it is the first 
step to a closer and more effective cooperation. Moving precisely towards 
this direction both governments, in absolute accordance with the Turkish 
government, agreed to complete the Tripartite Agreement by forming an 
official alliance, in order to stabilize peace in the spirit of the Charter of the 
United Nations. For this purpose we decided that the alliance should be 
established (sera établie) by the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
during the forthcoming annual conference in Belgrade.
Desiring to extend the popular basis of the tripartite Ankara Agreement, 
both governments also agreed, following Marshal Papagos’ proposal, to es-
tablish a Tripartite Consultative Assembly, consisting of equal numbers of 
Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav members of the Parliaments. It will convene 
in the three capitals by rotation.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
S. Sfetas, Tito’s Visit to Greece ( June 1954) 151
The Turkish government has been kept informed through its Ambassador 
about the abovementioned discussions and has expressed its complete ap-
proval.53 
Comparing Ankara’s communiqué to Athens’ communiqué, it is obvious 
that the latter was stronger and more comprehensive. Papagos’ government 
wanted to play the leading role in the formation of the Balkan Alliance, 
indicating that Greece superseded Turkey in Balkan affairs within NATO. 
On 5 June Popović held a press conference for Greek and foreign 
journalists at the Yugoslav embassy. He distanced the Trieste problem from 
the signing of the Balkan Alliance and expressed his belief that there was 
no difference between announcing the signing of the agreement and its ac-
tual signing during the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers with-
out Yugoslavia’s accession into NATO being necessary.54 Concerning the 
Macedonian issue, he stated that it was no impediment for the develop-
ment of excellent relations between the two countries. Regarding the Greek 
government’s intention to internationalize the Cyprus problem he pointed 
out that Yugoslavia would specify its position when Greece made its appeal 
to the UN, however he made it clear that the principles of self-determina-
tion and emancipation were underlying Yugoslavia’s foreign policy.55 
Tito’s visit to Greece was welcomed by the western press (with Italy’s 
reservation), but it was criticized, as expected, by eastern European press and 
radio stations. They treated it as an attempt to implement the new Ameri-
can strategy of linking up the Balkan Alliance with the European Defence 
community and to NATO.56 Hatching a conspiracy theory they connected 
Tito’s visit to Ankara and Athens with Adenauer’s previous visit to Greece 
and Turkey; on its broadcast of 7 June Sofia’s radio station suggested that 
the Balkan Military Alliance aimed at the formation of a great anti-Soviet 
bloc with the participation of Hitler’s renewed army in West Germany and 
Franco’s executioners of the Spanish people. Yugoslavia’s haste to forge the 
Military Alliance before the solution of the Trieste problem did not reflect 
Belgrade’s will to maintain good relations with the Balkan states. “The Bal-
kan Military Alliance will become a weapon to exacerbate the tension in 
this area of the world and to stifle the people’s struggle for peace and true 
international security.”57 On the occasion of Tito’s visit to Greece, the Bul-
53 To Vima, 6 June 1954.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 APR-KPR I-2/3. Pregled pisanja inostranih agencija i štampe od 30. maja do 5. juna 
o poseti druga predsednika Grčkoj i o balkanskom savezu.
57 Ibid.
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garian press reported that citizens were arrested by the police in Athens.58 
It referred to a small group of pro-Soviet communists who regarded Tito as 
a traitor of socialism and held him responsible for the defeat of the Demo-
cratic Army.
From the Greek side, Tito’s visit to Athens was a diplomatic success. 
The Balkan Alliance project was put forward there. The Yugoslav side made 
concessions on bilateral issues, such as the free zone of Thessaloniki. Besides, 
neither the “Macedonian minority” issue nor the lifting of the Legislation 
Act had been raised. Popović understood that the journal The Voice of the Ae-
geans with its anti-Greek and anti-American articles undermined Yugoslav 
foreign policy and in a short time its publication was banned.59 Further, he 
assured Greece that Yugoslavia would support Cypriot self-determination. 
Tito dispelled all Greek suspicions that Yugoslavia had territorial claims 
on Greece. He visited the Acropolis, he entertained the Greek opposition 
leaders in Megaro Maximou (the prime minister’s residence in Athens), he 
gifted horses to the Greek Royal family and he inspected the Greek fleet in 
Salamina accompanied by King Pavlos. The Greek press distanced the Tri-
este problem from the Balkan Pact, pointing out that they were completely 
different issues.
Does Italy consider that it could ever go to war with Yugoslavia over Tri-
este? But our Allies and their Allies are never going to allow this war to 
break out for many reasons and for one vital one. Trieste is under inter-
national supervision. And any violation of this status would mean a war 
against those who guarantee the order in this unsafe region … Diplomacy 
is easy, when it is exercised on the banks of the Thames or the Potomac. 
But here we have the Danube and the Evros. And Marshal Papagos 
pointed this out in one of his recent interviews regarding the purposes of 
the Balkan Alliance: in order to be fruitful, the Alliance must be equally 
interested in both the Danube and the Evros.60 
Tito returned to Yugoslavia via Thessaloniki. Accompanied by King 
Pavlos he sailed on the cruiser “Elli” to Thessaloniki, where he was wel-
comed by the minister of Northern Greece and the authorities of the city. 
He laid a wreath at the Serbian cemetery in honour of those who had fallen 
during the First World War, and he attended the military parade at Sedes 
airport. Obviously, with these symbolic actions Tito aimed at demonstrat-
58 Rabotničesko delo, 2 June 1954.
59 See Iakovos Mihailidis, “Οικοδομώντας το παρελθόν. Σλαβομακεδόνες πολιτικοί 
πρόσφυγες στη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας: Μια πρώτη προσέγγιση” [Build-
ing up the past. Slavomacedonian political refugees. A first approach.], Istor 13 (2002), 
118.
60 Kathimerini, 6 June 1954.
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ing that the planned Balkan Alliance followed past Greek-Serbian allianc-
es’ tradition, since it turned against their “common enemy”, Bulgaria. The 
newspaper Ellinikos Vorras (Greek North) hastened to characterize Tito as a 
hajduk-fighter who continued the traditional Greek-Serbian friendship.
Greece has never fought against Serbia, since the emancipation of both 
nations. On the contrary, these two nations have always fought side by 
side, when there was a struggle for freedom. In Pirot there are hundreds of 
Greek soldiers’ tombs, who fell during the struggle for Serbia’s liberation, 
and in Thessaloniki rest Serbian soldiers, who fought side by side with their 
Greek brothers to dam the German-Bulgarian torrent during World War 
I … Yugoslav peoples were too proud to open the gates through which 
Hitler’s armies would fire on us. And they revolted. The hajduks’ descen-
dants, the Greeks’ fellow-soldiers during World War I, marched to Bel-
grade and overthrew the dishonest men and the traitors. And the Yugoslavs 
held our hand and walked with us to Golgotha … Marshal Tito, a popular 
hero, has also been a hajduk, who slept many times with a rifle in his arms, 
before entering the Presidential Residence in Belgrade. And when he was 
convinced that the Kremlin’s communism was the greatest betrayal for the 
workers and peasants and a pretence for the imposition of Russian imperi-
alism, he acted according to the moral and material interests of Yugoslavia: 
he applied to the sincere friends of his country, among which Greece has 
been the longest and the best tested.61 
Tito was never a hajduk but a partisan. The hajduk tradition was 
claimed by the Serbians chetniks of Draža Mihajlović during the Second 
World War. The military coup of 27 March 1941 had been hatched by the 
Serbian military rather than the “Yugoslav peoples” as a whole, and it was 
celebrated only by the Serbs. Tito had no intention of selling out com-
munism. However, under those new conditions it was important to cre-
ate an impression that Tito’s Yugoslavia was continuing the tradition of 
the Greek-Serbian alliance, despite any ideological differences. Tito sent 
the same message. He left Thessaloniki and returned to Belgrade by train 
via Skopje, obviously suggesting that Greece and Yugoslavia constituted a 
common defence space. Delivering a speech in Skopje, on 7 June, Tito ex-
plained the reasons for his visit to Greece:
I know what you are interested in. You would like to know something 
about the success of our visit, of our mission. And you know most of it 
having read about it in the daily press. As far as I am concerned, I may 
emphasize once more all that has been made known and published — and 
that is that our mission has been a success. We went to friendly Greece to 
prepare the way for the completion of an undertaking which has been our 
goal for several years and we have succeeded in this. The Greek people and 
their leading officials had the same target and were waiting impatiently for 
61 Ellinikos Vorras, 6 June 1954.
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this day to come when the road of our cooperation was to be determined 
more precisely, the way in which our security was to be protected, for our 
freedom and peaceful development.62 
In such circumstances it did not make sense for Tito to raise the 
Macedonian issue. Nine years earlier, in October 1945, in a speech deliv-
ered in Skopje Tito had stood up for the “Macedonian people’s” right to be 
united.63 Speaking at a similar rally in Belgrade, Tito justified the Balkan 
Alliance with the imminent danger to Yugoslavia’s security:
One would wonder, well, you say every day that the danger of war is gradu-
ally decreasing, that the war danger has passed. It is not true that it has 
passed, but it is less than it was, and tomorrow it will be lesser, and I do not 
believe at all that it is near. However, this does not mean that we have not 
undertaken all possible measures in order to be able to prevent any pos-
sible danger, by our unity, by our readiness to defend our independence, our 
freedom and our integrity.64 
On 10 June 1954 Belgrade’s Federal Parliament ratified the results of Tito’s 
visit to Athens.
The forthcoming formation of the Balkan Alliance caused alarm in 
Moscow, since the likelihood of Yugoslavia’s accession to NATO could no 
longer be excluded. The re-establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav diplomatic re-
lations had not been followed by any substantial Soviet initiative for the 
normalization of the relations. Therefore Tito was still suspicious of Khrush-
chev. The Soviets were willing to prevent Yugoslavia’s accession to NATO. 
The opening of Greek-Bulgarian negotiations on resetting the borderline in 
1953 was undoubtedly part of the Soviet strategy to involve Bulgaria more 
into Balkan affairs in the aftermath of the Ankara Treaty. Vâlko Červrenkov, 
Bulgaria’s prime minister and secretary general of the Bulgarian Commu-
nist Party, was invited to Moscow in early June 1953. The Soviet leadership 
requested Bulgaria to pursue a dynamic Balkan policy and mainly to nor-
malize its relations with Yugoslavia as a capitalistic state,65 that is, practically 
to accept the Yugoslav road to socialism (workers’ self-management). In the 
62 Borba, 8 June 1954.
63 Spyridon Sfetas, Η διαμόρφωση της σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας. Μια επώδυνη 
διαδικασία [The configuration of the Slavomacedonian identity. A painful procedure] 
(Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2003), 202–203.
64 Borba, 8 June 1954.
65 Evgenia Kalinova & Iskra Baeva, Bâlgarskite prehodi 1939–2002 (Sofia: Paradigma, 
2002), 199. On Bulgaria’s attitude towards the 1953–1958 Soviet-Yugoslavian rap-
prochement see Evgenia Kalinova, “Bâlgarija i sâvetskoto-jugoslavskoto ‘sbližavane’ 
1953–1958 g.”, in Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961, ed. Slobodan Selinić (Bel-
grade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 118–137.
S. Sfetas, Tito’s Visit to Greece ( June 1954) 155
second half of 1953 diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
were re-established and commercial transactions started. Besides, Greek-
Bulgarian diplomatic relations were re-established on 22 May 1954 at the 
level of chargé d’affairs instead of ambassadors, due to Bulgaria’s reluctance 
to pay off the war reparations it owed to Greece.66 
The re-establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav, Bulgarian-Yugoslav and 
Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic relations did not prevent Athens and Bel-
grade from promoting the negotiations to transform the Balkan Pact into 
a military alliance. Tito’s visit to Athens perturbed both Sofia and Moscow. 
Trying to frustrate Yugoslavia’s accession to NATO, Khrushchev thought 
it was advisable to send a message to Belgrade that Moscow had no aggres-
sive plans against Yugoslavia. On 17 June 1954 Rabotničesko Delo, the offi-
cial Bulgarian newspaper, published an article with the title “The Bulgarian 
people have always favoured peace and good relations with the neighbours”. 
It emphasized Bulgaria’s efforts to normalize its relations with Greece and 
Yugoslavia and confirmed that Bulgaria applied a peaceful policy.
The People’s Republic of Bulgaria is maintaining multilateral friendly rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and other People’s Republics. Regarding the 
capitalist countries Bulgaria’s policy is based on the principle that social 
system differences should not be an obstacle to peaceful relations among 
the peoples. Bulgaria is widening actual cooperation with these countries 
on the basis of mutual interests and respect for their national indepen-
dence and sovereignty. Bulgaria’s foreign policy efforts aim at consolidating 
peace in the Balkans. Bulgaria genuinely wishes to re-establish relations of 
good neighbourliness with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. On the 9th of 
September, in his opening speech for the 9th anniversary of the people’s 
uprising, Comrade Vâlko Červrenkov stated that our people’s government 
wishes to settle all the outstanding questions with its neighbours — Tur-
key, Yugoslavia and Greece. We do not have any aggressive plans against 
anyone. We do not want to impose our social system on anyone. We want 
to have good relations with them and we are willing, on the principle of 
mutual respect, to discuss the settlement of disputed issues, to wipe out any 
misunderstanding and to re-establish relations of good neighbourliness. 
The past has proved that our country’s initiative for peace was absolutely 
66 See the Greek-Bulgarian declaration in Paris regarding the reestablishment of Greek-
Bulgarian diplomatic relations, in V. Kontis et al., eds., Σοβιετική Ένωση και Βαλκάνια 
στις δεκατίες 1950 και 1960. Συλλογή εγγράφων [Soviet Union and the Balkans in 
1950–1960. A collection of documents] (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 2003), 16–18. On 
the diplomatic background, see Georgi Daskalov, Bâlgarija i Gârcija. Ot razrivakâm 
pomirenie 1944–1964 (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2003), 
228–249. 
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realistic and that all efforts to mitigate tensions and to restore good rela-
tions with our neighbours have led to positive results...67 
The article highlighted the re-establishment of Bulgarian-Yugoslav and 
Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic relations and concluded:
Ideological differences cannot be an obstacle for communication between 
peoples. Our people appreciate the contribution of every nation, big or 
small, to our global cultural treasure. Extensive cultural exchanges among 
countries could reveal the potential for a direct acquaintance with every 
nation’s achievements and it could, consequently, lead to putting aside all 
misunderstanding and distrust. The People’s Republic of Bulgaria supports, 
and will continue to support, such contacts with all countries on the basis 
of reciprocity and mutual respect. Our country will do everything that 
depends on it to consolidate peace in the Balkans; it is convinced that the 
consolidation of peace in this part of Europe constitutes a substantial con-
tribution to the efforts of mankind to consolidate peace worldwide. Our 
country will keep trying to seek the settlement of all disputes and it will 
keep working on the reestablishment of relations of good neighbourliness 
with Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece.68
The article surprised diplomatic circles. It was the first time that Bul-
garia, contrary to its former attitude, neither referred to the Balkan Pact nor 
spoke out against it.69 As the Yugoslav ambassador in Sofia Mita Miljković 
found out, the article had been written by the Bulgarian minister of foreign 
affairs Minčo Nejčev, who also confirmed that the article had been approved 
by Červrenkov and could be considered as a keystone of Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy.70 There was no doubt that Bulgaria was acting by Soviet command. 
The “de-Stalinization” in Bulgaria had already begun. At the Sixth Congress 
of the Bulgarian Communist Party (18/2 – 3/3/1954) Červrenkov had lost 
his position as the party’s general secretary, but he kept his position as prime 
minister. The new first secretary Todor Živkov, nominated by Khrushchev, 
had not yet asserted himself within the party and until 1956 he played a 
marginal role in Červrenkov’s shade. Bulgaria was worrying that Yugoslavia 
would soon raise the Macedonian issue, as it had done in 1944–48, i.e. that 
it would demand the secession of the Bulgarian part of Macedonia and its 
annexation to the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” in exchange for the 
67 “Bâlgarskijat narod stoj tvârdo za mir i dobri otnošenija sâs svojite sâsedi”, Rabotničesko 
delo, 17 June 1954. 
68 Ibid.
69 On Bulgaria’s general attitude towards the Balkan Pact see Jordan Baev, “Bulgaria and 
the Balkan Pact (1953–1954)”, in Spoljna politika Jugoslavije, ed. Selinić, 587–601.
70 Mita Miljković, Burne diplomatske godine. Iz sofijskog dnevnika 1953–1956 (Belgrade: 
Službeni list SRJ, 1995), 116.
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western outlands (Caribrod and Bossilevgrad). Nejčev had expressed these 
fears to Konstantinos Tranos, Greece’s chargé d’affairs in Sofia.71 
On 26 June, a few days after the article was published, the Soviet 
Union’s ambassador delivered a letter from Khrushchev to Tito. Although 
the letter’s content was not made public at that time, it could be conclud-
ed from Tito’s and other Yugoslav officials’ statements that Khrushchev 
expressed the Soviet Union’s willingness to normalize bilateral relations 
with Yugoslavia, recognising Stalin’s mistakes in 1948.72 Khrushchev’s 
letter of 22 June 1954 has recently been published and it confirms that 
the Soviet leader stressed the need for the normalization of bilateral So-
viet-Yugoslav relations after Beriya’s execution and Djilas’ removal.73 The 
Soviet Union’s conciliatory and peaceful attitude was perceived by Bel-
grade as a noticeable decrease of the Soviet threat and it undoubtedly 
affected Yugoslavia’s attitude towards the Balkan Alliance in particular 
and towards the West in general. For Washington the Balkan Alliance 
had to be linked up with NATO74 and its formation should coincide with 
the settlement of the Trieste dispute.75 Yugoslavia separated the two is-
sues and was reluctant to undertake any obligation towards NATO. This 
became clear during the expert committee’s sitting in Athens (28 June 
– 5 July 1954), when the Yugoslav delegation objected to the Greek draft 
for the alliance. The preamble of the Greek draft provided that the treaty 
of alliance would constitute a basic factor for order and stability and that 
the measures which would be taken, in compliance with the United Na-
tions Charter, would reinforce collective security. Close tripartite coop-
eration and cooperation with other states as well would contribute to the 
maintenance of international security. Article 1 referred to the necessity 
of strengthening collective security according to provisions of the UN 
Charter. Article 2 provided that the Contracting Parties should reinforce 
71 Ibid., 119. After Tito’s rift with Stalin Bulgaria denied the existence of Macedonian 
minority on its soil and opposed the creation of a Macedonian nation of anti-Bulgar-
ian basis. See Spyridon Sfetas, Το Μακεδονικό και η Βουλγαρία. Πλήρη τα απόρρητα 
βουλγαρικά έγγραφα 1950–1967 [The Macedonian question and Bulgaria. Classified 
Bulgarian documents 1950–1967] (Thessaloniki: Association of Macedonian Studies, 
2009).
72 See Bogetić, Jugoslavija, 148–149.
73 See httpt://www.wilsoncenter.org./index. Cold War International History Project. Dig-
ital Archive, Collection: Yugoslavia in the Cold War. Letter from Khrushchev to Josip Broz 
Tito (06/22/1954).
74 FRUS 1952–1954, vol. VIII, 661–662, Νο. 349, The Secretary of the State to the 
Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, July 8, 1954, Top Secret.
75 Ibid., 659–660, no. 348, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, Washing-
ton, July 2, 1954, Top Secret.
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their defence system, individually or collectively, and grant mutual assis-
tance. Article 3 provided that any armed aggression against one or several 
of them should be considered as an aggression against all the Contracting 
Parties which had the right to defend themselves individually or col-
lectively. Article 4 provided that in case Greece and Turkey were forced 
to take measures to meet their obligations towards NATO according to 
Article 5 of the Charter, Yugoslavia was bound to take proportionate 
measures in consultation with Greece and Turkey. Article 7 provided that 
the Contracting Parties were obliged to monitor the international situa-
tion and in the event of a grave deterioration to take preventive measures, 
proportional to the threat to their political independence and territorial 
sovereignty, in order to secure their mutual interests. Article 10 provided 
close cooperation of the Contracting Parties with international organi-
zations which had been entrusted with the consolidation of peace and 
international security.76 
With their remarks the Yugoslav experts aimed at attributing an in-
tra-Balkan character to the Balkan Alliance and loosening the links between 
the Balkan Alliance and NATO as far as Yugoslavia’s obligations towards 
NATO members were concerned. They noticed that the preamble of the 
Greek draft made no reference to the issues of territorial integrity, indepen-
dence and common security of the Balkan Alliance’s member states. Ar-
ticle 2 was essentially accepted. In Article 4 the Yugoslav experts discerned 
Yugoslavia’s equation with Greece and Turkey as regards their obligations 
towards NATO. Their thesis was that any specification of Yugoslavia’s ob-
ligations to NATO should be avoided. Article 7 was considered to exceed 
the limits of defensive alliance and Article 10 was also labelled as a clause 
for cooperation between Yugoslavia and NATO.77 
Therefore, three trends emerged. Greece was striving to link up the 
Balkan Alliance with NATO and to involve Yugoslavia in its defence mech-
anisms, Yugoslavia was trying to separate the Balkan Alliance from NATO 
and to confine its obligations only to the Balkans, while Turkey, primar-
ily interested in Middle East issues, did not rush for the formation of the 
Balkan Alliance, combining the latter with the settlement of the Trieste 
problem.
The “Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Sup-
port” that was signed on 9 August 1954 at Bled (Slovenia) by foreign 
ministers Koča Popović, Stefanos Stefanopoulos and Fuad Köprülü, bal-
anced the Greek and the Yugoslav position. Article 2 provided that any 
76 APR-KPR 1-2/3. Ugovor o Savezu, političkoj saradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći. Grčki 
Projekat.
77 Ibid.
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armed aggression against one or several of the Contracting Parties, at any 
part of their territories, “shall be considered as an aggression against all the 
Contracting Parties, which, in consequence, exercising the right of legitimate 
collective defence recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, shall 
individually or collectively render assistance to the Party or Parties attacked, 
undertaking in common accord and immediately all measures, including the use 
of armed force, which they shall deem necessary for efficacious defence”. Article 
6 provided that “in the event of a grave deterioration of the international 
situation, and especially in the areas where such deterioration could have a 
negative effect, direct or indirect, upon security in their area, the Contracting 
Parties shall consult each other with a view to examining the situation and 
determining their attitude. ... In the event of an armed aggression against a 
country toward which one or several of the Contracting Parties should at any 
moment of the signing of the present Treaty have undertaken obligations of 
mutual assistance, the Contracting Parties will consult each other on the mea-
sures to be taken, in conformity with the aims of the United Nations, to meet 
the situation that would have thus been created in their area. It is understood 
that consultation provided for under this Article could also include an urgent 
meeting of the Permanent Council”. Article 10 provided that “provisions of 
the present Treaty do not affect, and cannot be interpreted as affecting in any 
way, the rights and obligations that arise for Greece and Turkey from the North 
Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949”. A Permanent Council was established, 
consisting of the foreign ministers and other members of the govern-
ments of the Contracting Parties. It would be convened regularly twice a 
year. The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties should continue their 
joint work. The Treaty was concluded for a period of twenty years. If none 
of the Contracting Parties should cancel it one year before its terms had 
expired, the Treaty should be considered as tacitly prolonged for another 
year and so forth until cancelled by one of the Contracting Parties.78 
The Treaty had a narrow Balkan framework and Yugoslavia under-
took no clear obligations towards NATO. It was not definitely obliged to 
provide military assistance to any NATO member that could be attacked, 
apart from Greece and Turkey; however, it was self-evident that NATO 
would collectively support Yugoslavia in case of emergency. It was obvious 
that Yugoslavia wanted to avoid involvement in NATO’s defensive mecha-
nisms and subordination to American military command. Yugoslavia’s 
78 See the text of the Treaty in Documents on American Foreign Policy 1954, ed. Peter V. 
Curl, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers (New 
York 1955), 186–190.
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closer relations with NATO would mar the process of the Soviet-Yugoslav 
rapprochement and could be a threat to the country’s communist regime.79
With Soviet support for Yugoslavia, the Trieste dispute was basically 
settled in October 1954 through a Memorandum of Understanding, but 
the Balkan Pact proved to be stillborn. With the exacerbation of the Cy-
prus dispute between Greece and Turkey in 1955 and the Soviet-Yugoslav 
rapprochement in 1955–56, the Balkan Pact lost its practical significance. 
In May–June 1955 Khrushchev visited Belgrade, accompanied by prime 
minister Bulganin. He recognized the Yugoslav way to socialism (Declara-
tion of Belgrade) and promised financial aid. Khrushchev intended to bring 
Yugoslavia back to the Soviet sphere of influence and to generate its acces-
sion into the Warsaw Pact. It was not coincidental that Khrushchev’s visit 
to Belgrade took place immediately after the establishment of the Warsaw 
Pact. In April 1956 the Cominform was dissolved and in June 1956 Tito 
visited Moscow. With the Declaration of Moscow, Khrushchev recognised 
once again Yugoslavia’s way to socialism.80 However, Yugoslavia’s foreign 
policy was based on the principle of equal distance from the East and Tito 
became leader of the non-aligned movement.
In 1956–58 there was new friction in Soviet-Yugoslavian relations, 
mainly because of the Hungarian issue. In April 1957 at Soviet prodding 
Romanian prime minister Chivu Stoica submitted a proposal to the Balkan 
governments for a Balkan Conference in order to discuss issues of economic 
cooperation and collective security. With this political motion the Soviet 
leader aimed at further weakening the Balkan Pact, since Khrushchev had 
not yet ruled out the likelihood of Yugoslavia’s reliance on NATO. Never-
theless, the Soviet-Yugoslav relations were soon warmed up again because 
of Yugoslavia’s decision to support Soviet positions on international issues. 
Showing flexibility, Tito supported the Soviet position on the German issue 
and he condemned China’s adventurism and the American spy war against 
the Soviet Union. Thus, another noticeable rapprochement between Bel-
grade and Moscow took place in 1961–62. 
These new circumstances weakened the military cooperation between 
Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The Permanent Council convened only once 
(28/2 – 3/3/1955) and focused on the establishment of the Balkan Con-
sultative Assembly which, nevertheless, never met. The Permanent Council 
met by rotation in Belgrade (1954), in Ankara (1955), in Athens (1956) and 
79 On general NATO-Yugoslav relations see Bojan Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO 
(Belgrade: Vojska, 2003).
80 On this initial phase of the Soviet-Yugoslav relations normalization see Svetozar 
Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, comradeship, 
confrontation, 1953–1957 (London: Routledge, Taylor & France Group, 2011).
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again in Belgrade (1957), but without any results. The Balkan Institute was 
not created. Suggestions to organize common military exercises, to establish 
a common Balkan Chamber of Commerce and to collaborate in nuclear 
research remained unfulfilled. The Balkan Pact was practically devitalized, 
although no party denounced it.
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